Discussion:
Formalizing the notion of conceptual Truth (Simple English Included)
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peteolcott
2018-10-31 04:19:41 UTC
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Simple English Version:
Conceptual Truth is merely the result of correct reasoning
based on facts. Conceptual facts are merely expressions of
language defined to be true on the basis of the meaning of
their words.

Formal Logic Version:
∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ L True(L, x) ↔ Theorem(L, x)

Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott

It took we thousands of USENET postings since 1997 to get it
boiled down to that simple essence.

I have a more than dozen related papers:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Peter_Olcott/research
peteolcott
2018-10-31 05:43:22 UTC
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This original post is 100% perfectly related to the
formalization of linguistic semantic compositionality.
Post by peteolcott
Conceptual Truth is merely the result of correct reasoning
based on facts. Conceptual facts are merely expressions of
language defined to be true on the basis of the meaning of
their words.
∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ L True(L, x) ↔ Theorem(L, x)
Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
It took we thousands of USENET postings since 1997 to get it
boiled down to that simple essence.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Peter_Olcott/research
It took we thousands
Apparently a subconscious acknowledgement to all of my reviewers
over the years without which none of these results would have ever
occurred. My reviewers were the fitness function to my genetic
algorithm of hit and miss efforts.

alt.philosophy, comp.theory, sci.logic, and sci.lang.

I began talking in alt.philosophy then found a much higher quality
of review in the technical groups.

I keep sci.lang in the cross-postings because everything that I have
been saying is related to the formalization of linguistic semantic
compositionality. It is this single aspect that is my passion for
linguistics.

All of my postings in comp.theory pertained to semantic analysis
of the Halting Problem.
Arnaud Fournet
2018-10-31 07:33:59 UTC
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Post by peteolcott
This original post is 100% perfectly related to the
formalization of linguistic semantic compositionality.
Post by peteolcott
Conceptual Truth is merely the result of correct reasoning
based on facts. Conceptual facts are merely expressions of
language defined to be true on the basis of the meaning of
their words.
∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ L True(L, x) ↔ Theorem(L, x)
Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
It took we thousands of USENET postings since 1997 to get it
boiled down to that simple essence.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Peter_Olcott/research
It took we thousands
Apparently a subconscious acknowledgement to all of my reviewers
over the years without which none of these results would have ever
occurred. My reviewers were the fitness function to my genetic
algorithm of hit and miss efforts.
alt.philosophy, comp.theory, sci.logic, and sci.lang.
I began talking in alt.philosophy then found a much higher quality
of review in the technical groups.
I keep sci.lang in the cross-postings because everything that I have
been saying is related to the formalization of linguistic semantic
compositionality. It is this single aspect that is my passion for
linguistics.
the huge problem is that your "linguistics" has nothing to do with linguistics.
And all the crap you dump on sci.lang is unrequested and unwelcome.
Post by peteolcott
All of my postings in comp.theory pertained to semantic analysis
of the Halting Problem.
Franz Gnaedinger
2018-10-31 07:38:47 UTC
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Peter Olcott knows the absolute and complete and total truth, he is the author
of life and creator of life, he creates our future minds in order that we can
go on existing, he has hundred reasons to assume that he is God, he is a human
being _and_ God, he is the one Creator of the Universe (claims he made in
sci.lang that he confounds with psy.lang). He solves all problems by dismissing
proven theorems (Goedel, Turing) but he never gets rid of the bug he shoves
around endlessly, writing ever more final versions of his never final papers,
he achieves nothing real, he can't write a modest but useful program, let alone
improve Alexa or Siri or Bablefish or Google Translate, let aloner shed light
on a difficult passage in a great author, and let alonest on the workings of
language itself. Instead he wasted more than thirty years of his God given time.
Athel Cornish-Bowden
2018-10-31 07:51:22 UTC
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Peter Olcott knows the absolute and complete and total truth, ...
You were criticizing Peter Daniels the other day for what you claimed
to be lack of memory. Have you yourself forgotten how many times that
you have posted this exact same comment about Peter Olcott in recent
weeks? What good does it do to say the same thing over and over again?
Perhaps more important, you seem to have understood why Peter Olcott's
contributions are off-topic and worthless, but you seem not to have
understood that many of your criticisms of him apply just as well to
the garabage that you post over and over again.
--
athel
Franz Gnaedinger
2018-10-31 08:23:40 UTC
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Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Peter Olcott knows the absolute and complete and total truth, ...
You were criticizing Peter Daniels the other day for what you claimed
to be lack of memory. Have you yourself forgotten how many times that
you have posted this exact same comment about Peter Olcott in recent
weeks? What good does it do to say the same thing over and over again?
Perhaps more important, you seem to have understood why Peter Olcott's
contributions are off-topic and worthless, but you seem not to have
understood that many of your criticisms of him apply just as well to
the garabage that you post over and over again.
First, I vary my comments, and second I have factual evidence that Allgod
is wrong, for he goes against P R O V E N theorems of mathematical logic.
Do that and you are out, tilt, game over. There are no proven theorems in
linguistics, only better or lesser evidence. And I offer test cases, for
example my triple test case regarding the name of Zeus, the Indo-European
homeland, and words for the horse. You can't go for my test case, but you
can drop verdicts from above, so you are unable of discussing on the
scientific level. Goes without saying that Allgod offers no test case.
And you can't cope with him, nor with other posters of his caliber.
The kooks and hyperkooks observe the textbook fraction cloesely and see
how they fail, most always escaping to meta-levels because they lack
scientific arguments, and thus they feel confirmed.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-10-31 13:44:10 UTC
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Post by Franz Gnaedinger
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Peter Olcott knows the absolute and complete and total truth, ...
You were criticizing Peter Daniels the other day for what you claimed
to be lack of memory. Have you yourself forgotten how many times that
you have posted this exact same comment about Peter Olcott in recent
weeks? What good does it do to say the same thing over and over again?
Perhaps more important, you seem to have understood why Peter Olcott's
contributions are off-topic and worthless, but you seem not to have
understood that many of your criticisms of him apply just as well to
the garabage that you post over and over again.
First, I vary my comments, and second I have factual evidence that Allgod
is wrong, for he goes against P R O V E N theorems of mathematical logic.
Thus both his and your messages about his do not belong in sci.lang.
peteolcott
2018-10-31 15:03:49 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Franz Gnaedinger
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Peter Olcott knows the absolute and complete and total truth, ...
You were criticizing Peter Daniels the other day for what you claimed
to be lack of memory. Have you yourself forgotten how many times that
you have posted this exact same comment about Peter Olcott in recent
weeks? What good does it do to say the same thing over and over again?
Perhaps more important, you seem to have understood why Peter Olcott's
contributions are off-topic and worthless, but you seem not to have
understood that many of your criticisms of him apply just as well to
the garabage that you post over and over again.
First, I vary my comments, and second I have factual evidence that Allgod
is wrong, for he goes against P R O V E N theorems of mathematical logic.
Thus both his and your messages about his do not belong in sci.lang.
These two books would disagree:

http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199541072.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199541072

The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality
Compositionality is a key concept in linguistics, the philosophy of mind and language, and throughout the cognitive sciences. Understanding how it works is a central element of syntactic and semantic analysis, and a challenge for models of cognition. In
this book, scholars from every relevant field report on the state of the art in all aspects of the subject. They reveal the connections in different lines of research, and highlight its most challenging problems and opportunities. The force and
justification of compositionality have long been contentious.

First proposed by Frege as the notion that the meaning of an expression is generally determined by the meaning and syntax of its parts, it has since been deployed as a constraint on the relation between theories of syntax and semantics, as a means of
analysis, and, more recently, as underlying the structures of representational systems such as computer programs and neural architectures. This Handbook explores these and many other dimensions of one of the most exciting fields in the study of language
and cognition.

https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/type-logical-semantics

Type-Logical Semantics
Based on an introductory course on natural-language semantics, this book provides an introduction to type-logical grammar and the range of linguistic phenomena that can be handled in categorial grammar. It also contains a great deal of original work on
categorial grammar and its application to natural-language semantics. The author chose the type-logical categorial grammar as his grammatical basis because of its broad syntactic coverage and its strong linkage of syntax and semantics. Although its basic
orientation is linguistic, the book should also be of interest to logicians and computer scientists seeking connections between logical systems and natural language.

It is not that these things do not apply to natural language linguistics, it is simply that most linguists do not have the sufficient math background to appreciate them.
DKleinecke
2018-10-31 16:53:07 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Franz Gnaedinger
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Peter Olcott knows the absolute and complete and total truth, ...
You were criticizing Peter Daniels the other day for what you claimed
to be lack of memory. Have you yourself forgotten how many times that
you have posted this exact same comment about Peter Olcott in recent
weeks? What good does it do to say the same thing over and over again?
Perhaps more important, you seem to have understood why Peter Olcott's
contributions are off-topic and worthless, but you seem not to have
understood that many of your criticisms of him apply just as well to
the garabage that you post over and over again.
First, I vary my comments, and second I have factual evidence that Allgod
is wrong, for he goes against P R O V E N theorems of mathematical logic.
Thus both his and your messages about his do not belong in sci.lang.
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199541072.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199541072
The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality
Compositionality is a key concept in linguistics, the philosophy of mind and language, and throughout the cognitive sciences. Understanding how it works is a central element of syntactic and semantic analysis, and a challenge for models of cognition. In
this book, scholars from every relevant field report on the state of the art in all aspects of the subject. They reveal the connections in different lines of research, and highlight its most challenging problems and opportunities. The force and
justification of compositionality have long been contentious.
First proposed by Frege as the notion that the meaning of an expression is generally determined by the meaning and syntax of its parts, it has since been deployed as a constraint on the relation between theories of syntax and semantics, as a means of
analysis, and, more recently, as underlying the structures of representational systems such as computer programs and neural architectures. This Handbook explores these and many other dimensions of one of the most exciting fields in the study of language
and cognition.
https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/type-logical-semantics
Type-Logical Semantics
Based on an introductory course on natural-language semantics, this book provides an introduction to type-logical grammar and the range of linguistic phenomena that can be handled in categorial grammar. It also contains a great deal of original work on
categorial grammar and its application to natural-language semantics. The author chose the type-logical categorial grammar as his grammatical basis because of its broad syntactic coverage and its strong linkage of syntax and semantics. Although its basic
orientation is linguistic, the book should also be of interest to logicians and computer scientists seeking connections between logical systems and natural language.
It is not that these things do not apply to natural language linguistics, it is simply that most linguists do not have the sufficient math background to appreciate them.
The word "compositionality" is not used in the same way by
every writer on the subject. In its broadest (and least
precise) sense it surely exists for natural language. But
when it applied more stringently it falls apart as an
organizing principle - at least in every theory so far
proposed.

Mathematizing linguistics was Chomsky's goal some sixty
years ago - but his ideas as such failed to hold up even
for English alone much less for languages in general.
Richard Montague's proposals had a brief vogue but proved
to lead nowhere useful. Human language appears to be sui
generis and can be useful studied only by methods unique
to linguistics.
peteolcott
2018-10-31 19:15:25 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Franz Gnaedinger
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Peter Olcott knows the absolute and complete and total truth, ...
You were criticizing Peter Daniels the other day for what you claimed
to be lack of memory. Have you yourself forgotten how many times that
you have posted this exact same comment about Peter Olcott in recent
weeks? What good does it do to say the same thing over and over again?
Perhaps more important, you seem to have understood why Peter Olcott's
contributions are off-topic and worthless, but you seem not to have
understood that many of your criticisms of him apply just as well to
the garabage that you post over and over again.
First, I vary my comments, and second I have factual evidence that Allgod
is wrong, for he goes against P R O V E N theorems of mathematical logic.
Thus both his and your messages about his do not belong in sci.lang.
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199541072.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199541072
The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality
Compositionality is a key concept in linguistics, the philosophy of mind and language, and throughout the cognitive sciences. Understanding how it works is a central element of syntactic and semantic analysis, and a challenge for models of cognition. In
this book, scholars from every relevant field report on the state of the art in all aspects of the subject. They reveal the connections in different lines of research, and highlight its most challenging problems and opportunities. The force and
justification of compositionality have long been contentious.
First proposed by Frege as the notion that the meaning of an expression is generally determined by the meaning and syntax of its parts, it has since been deployed as a constraint on the relation between theories of syntax and semantics, as a means of
analysis, and, more recently, as underlying the structures of representational systems such as computer programs and neural architectures. This Handbook explores these and many other dimensions of one of the most exciting fields in the study of language
and cognition.
https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/type-logical-semantics
Type-Logical Semantics
Based on an introductory course on natural-language semantics, this book provides an introduction to type-logical grammar and the range of linguistic phenomena that can be handled in categorial grammar. It also contains a great deal of original work on
categorial grammar and its application to natural-language semantics. The author chose the type-logical categorial grammar as his grammatical basis because of its broad syntactic coverage and its strong linkage of syntax and semantics. Although its basic
orientation is linguistic, the book should also be of interest to logicians and computer scientists seeking connections between logical systems and natural language.
It is not that these things do not apply to natural language linguistics, it is simply that most linguists do not have the sufficient math background to appreciate them.
The word "compositionality" is not used in the same way by
every writer on the subject. In its broadest (and least
precise) sense it surely exists for natural language. But
when it applied more stringently it falls apart as an
organizing principle - at least in every theory so far
proposed.
Mathematizing linguistics was Chomsky's goal some sixty
years ago - but his ideas as such failed to hold up even
for English alone much less for languages in general.
Richard Montague's proposals had a brief vogue but proved
to lead nowhere useful. Human language appears to be sui
generis and can be useful studied only by methods unique
to linguistics.
∀L ∈ Formal_Systems ∀x ∈ L True(L, x) ↔ Theorem(L, x).

The following concrete example is a stepping stone to verifying the
above universal Truth predicate.

See if you can directly find any fault what-so-ever with the following
simplest possible formalization of the simplest possible concrete example:

LiarParadox ↔ LiarParadox ∈ F ~Theorem(F, LiarParadox)

If LiarParadox was a theorem of F this contradicts its assertion: ~Theorem(F, LiarParadox)

If ~LiarParadox was a theorem of F this contradicts its assertion: Theorem(F, LiarParadox)

∴ ~Boolean_Proposition(F, LiarParadox)

Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
Peter T. Daniels
2018-10-31 17:52:59 UTC
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Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Thus both his and your messages about his do not belong in sci.lang.
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199541072.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199541072
The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality
Compositionality is a key concept in linguistics, the philosophy of mind and language, and throughout the cognitive sciences. Understanding how it works is a central element of syntactic and semantic analysis, and a challenge for models of cognition.
No one has suggested that you do linguistic compositionality. (I neither
know nor care whether you do any other kind of compositionality.) This
book is thus not evidence that your stuff belongs in sci.lang.
peteolcott
2018-10-31 19:21:42 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Thus both his and your messages about his do not belong in sci.lang.
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199541072.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199541072
The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality
Compositionality is a key concept in linguistics, the philosophy of mind and language, and throughout the cognitive sciences. Understanding how it works is a central element of syntactic and semantic analysis, and a challenge for models of cognition.
No one has suggested that you do linguistic compositionality. (I neither
know nor care whether you do any other kind of compositionality.) This
book is thus not evidence that your stuff belongs in sci.lang.
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
DKleinecke
2018-10-31 19:28:58 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
peteolcott
2018-10-31 20:11:03 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
That statement seems quite absurd, thus you could only mean it
with some degree of subjective leeway of interpretation. If we
take your words 100% literally then saying that:

"a dog is not a type of cat" would be pure gibberish with
not the slightest nuance of a trace of any meaning what-so-ever.

Your actual intended meaning must be much more along the lines of:
{with all of the dishonesty that I see in the world it seems to
me that natural language typically as very little to do with truth}.

Some of the most horrible travesties in the world are because of these
exact same sort of errors of precision with language. These precision
errors allow lies to slip through the cracks unnoticed.

If it was not for these exact same precision errors in the use
of language sound bites would never carry nearly the same weight
as established facts.

In the age of alternative facts, lies are winning. With perfect
precision of language {alternative facts} are totally understood
to be lies by everyone, thus no chance what-so-ever of succeeding.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-10-31 20:38:20 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
That statement seems quite absurd, thus you could only mean it
with some degree of subjective leeway of interpretation. If we
"a dog is not a type of cat" would be pure gibberish with
not the slightest nuance of a trace of any meaning what-so-ever.
What on earth does "Truth" have to do with the definitions of words?

Do you imagine that "A unicorn is not a type of dragon" is uninterpretable?

One of the things you're probably taught on Day 1 of Linguistics 101 is
that (with the exception of a handful of onomatopoeic words) linguistic
signs -- "words," perhaps, to you -- are completely arbitrary. Is any one
of "dog," "chien," "Hund," or "canis" more expressive of doggy nature than
any of the others? Of course not. Those words are not True or False. "Dogs
smell bad" is neither True nor False. There are a lot more generalizations
in language, which have no Truth Value, than factual statements like "a dog
is not a kind of cat." (Which, incidentally, is factual only because the
words in it have been arbitrarily associated with particular referents.)
Post by peteolcott
{with all of the dishonesty that I see in the world it seems to
me that natural language typically as very little to do with truth}.
Don't continue to be absurd.
Post by peteolcott
Some of the most horrible travesties in the world are because of these
exact same sort of errors of precision with language. These precision
errors allow lies to slip through the cracks unnoticed.
Sorry, but Mr Orwell wasn't talking about language, he was talking about
the political use of language. Exactly the same language is used by Barack
Obama and Donald Trump, but one of them is rather better at it than the other.
Post by peteolcott
If it was not for these exact same precision errors in the use
of language sound bites would never carry nearly the same weight
as established facts.
"Precision" has nothing whatsoever to do with language, it has to do with
the use of language. Maybe you need to go join S. I. Hayakawa and "cleanse"
the language.
Post by peteolcott
In the age of alternative facts, lies are winning. With perfect
precision of language {alternative facts} are totally understood
to be lies by everyone, thus no chance what-so-ever of succeeding.
The very fact that lies can be uttered in perfectly grammatical sentences
shows what an utter crock your basic premise is.
peteolcott
2018-10-31 21:51:10 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
That statement seems quite absurd, thus you could only mean it
with some degree of subjective leeway of interpretation. If we
"a dog is not a type of cat" would be pure gibberish with
not the slightest nuance of a trace of any meaning what-so-ever.
What on earth does "Truth" have to do with the definitions of words?
The English word "Not" could not possibly have any semantic meaning
what-so-ever if English did not have the concept of {True} as an
aspect of the basis of the meaning of {Not}.
DKleinecke
2018-11-01 02:11:28 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
That statement seems quite absurd, thus you could only mean it
with some degree of subjective leeway of interpretation. If we
"a dog is not a type of cat" would be pure gibberish with
not the slightest nuance of a trace of any meaning what-so-ever.
What on earth does "Truth" have to do with the definitions of words?
The English word "Not" could not possibly have any semantic meaning
what-so-ever if English did not have the concept of {True} as an
aspect of the basis of the meaning of {Not}.
It is probably best not to give the word "not" any
intrinsic meaning. Rather one should address the
constructions (sequences of words) in which "not"
appears. Each such construction should be analyzed
on the basis of its own unique features.
peteolcott
2018-11-01 02:46:22 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
That statement seems quite absurd, thus you could only mean it
with some degree of subjective leeway of interpretation. If we
"a dog is not a type of cat" would be pure gibberish with
not the slightest nuance of a trace of any meaning what-so-ever.
What on earth does "Truth" have to do with the definitions of words?
The English word "Not" could not possibly have any semantic meaning
what-so-ever if English did not have the concept of {True} as an
aspect of the basis of the meaning of {Not}.
It is probably best not to give the word "not" any
intrinsic meaning. Rather one should address the
constructions (sequences of words) in which "not"
appears. Each such construction should be analyzed
on the basis of its own unique features.
Not inherits the key aspect of its base meaning from the concept
of True. Not essentially only means to toggle the Boolean value
of an expression's Boolean Property. Only the declarative sentence
type has a Boolean Property.
DKleinecke
2018-11-01 04:02:02 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
That statement seems quite absurd, thus you could only mean it
with some degree of subjective leeway of interpretation. If we
"a dog is not a type of cat" would be pure gibberish with
not the slightest nuance of a trace of any meaning what-so-ever.
What on earth does "Truth" have to do with the definitions of words?
The English word "Not" could not possibly have any semantic meaning
what-so-ever if English did not have the concept of {True} as an
aspect of the basis of the meaning of {Not}.
It is probably best not to give the word "not" any
intrinsic meaning. Rather one should address the
constructions (sequences of words) in which "not"
appears. Each such construction should be analyzed
on the basis of its own unique features.
Not inherits the key aspect of its base meaning from the concept
of True. Not essentially only means to toggle the Boolean value
of an expression's Boolean Property. Only the declarative sentence
type has a Boolean Property.
Hence you must be saying that sentences have properties
and that declarative sentences have a Boolean property
you call True or False. This is a strong hypothesis about
human language which IMO is not supported by facts.

In such a theory don't imperatives also have such a
property?
peteolcott
2018-11-01 15:41:15 UTC
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Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
That statement seems quite absurd, thus you could only mean it
with some degree of subjective leeway of interpretation. If we
"a dog is not a type of cat" would be pure gibberish with
not the slightest nuance of a trace of any meaning what-so-ever.
What on earth does "Truth" have to do with the definitions of words?
The English word "Not" could not possibly have any semantic meaning
what-so-ever if English did not have the concept of {True} as an
aspect of the basis of the meaning of {Not}.
It is probably best not to give the word "not" any
intrinsic meaning. Rather one should address the
constructions (sequences of words) in which "not"
appears. Each such construction should be analyzed
on the basis of its own unique features.
Not inherits the key aspect of its base meaning from the concept
of True. Not essentially only means to toggle the Boolean value
of an expression's Boolean Property. Only the declarative sentence
type has a Boolean Property.
Hence you must be saying that sentences have properties
and that declarative sentences have a Boolean property
you call True or False. This is a strong hypothesis about
human language which IMO is not supported by facts.
Just because most linguists do not bother to pay attention to
this level of detail does not entail that what I said is not
logically entailed.

Since I can directly see how all natural language can be
encoded in the simple syntax of HOL specified by my
Minimal Type Theory, I see these things much more clearly.

No one could explain to me how lambda calculus would encode
arithmetic using the ASCII digits.

Integers are represented in lambda calculus by the Church numerals.
Zero is represented by the lambda expression λfx.x, and other
integers are generated by the applying successor function λnfx.f(nfx)
to an existing integer n.
Post by DKleinecke
In such a theory don't imperatives also have such a
property?
No.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-01 16:38:43 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Hence you must be saying that sentences have properties
and that declarative sentences have a Boolean property
you call True or False. This is a strong hypothesis about
human language which IMO is not supported by facts.
Just because most linguists do not bother to pay attention to
this level of detail does not entail that what I said is not
logically entailed.
Linguists pay far more attention to far deeper levels of detail than are
dreamed of in your philosophy.
Post by peteolcott
Since I can directly see how all natural language can be
encoded in the simple syntax of HOL specified by my
Minimal Type Theory, I see these things much more clearly.
You have still never addressed any "natural language" dealing with things
to which "Truth Value" is simply irrelevant.
Post by peteolcott
No one could explain to me how lambda calculus would encode
arithmetic using the ASCII digits.
Integers are represented in lambda calculus by the Church numerals.
Zero is represented by the lambda expression λfx.x, and other
integers are generated by the applying successor function λnfx.f(nfx)
to an existing integer n.
Is there anything in those two paragraphs about human language?
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
In such a theory don't imperatives also have such a
property?
No.
What property do imperatives have? (Do you know what "imperatives" are?)
peteolcott
2018-11-01 19:10:13 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Hence you must be saying that sentences have properties
and that declarative sentences have a Boolean property
you call True or False. This is a strong hypothesis about
human language which IMO is not supported by facts.
Just because most linguists do not bother to pay attention to
this level of detail does not entail that what I said is not
logically entailed.
Linguists pay far more attention to far deeper levels of detail than are
dreamed of in your philosophy.
That is certainly the case. I am only focusing on the fundamental
architecture of the mathematical foundation of semantics.
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Since I can directly see how all natural language can be
encoded in the simple syntax of HOL specified by my
Minimal Type Theory, I see these things much more clearly.
You have still never addressed any "natural language" dealing with things
to which "Truth Value" is simply irrelevant.
The function is surjective (onto) if each element of the codomain is
mapped to by at least one element of the domain.

I am establishing the mathematical foundation of the surjective
mapping from natural language to its formalized equivalent.

Since the LHS of this mapping is entirely natural language I
have just proven that my work is related to natural language.
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
No one could explain to me how lambda calculus would encode
arithmetic using the ASCII digits.
Integers are represented in lambda calculus by the Church numerals.
Zero is represented by the lambda expression λfx.x, and other
integers are generated by the applying successor function λnfx.f(nfx)
to an existing integer n.
Is there anything in those two paragraphs about human language?
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
In such a theory don't imperatives also have such a
property?
No.
What property do imperatives have? (Do you know what "imperatives" are?)
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-01 20:38:05 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Hence you must be saying that sentences have properties
and that declarative sentences have a Boolean property
you call True or False. This is a strong hypothesis about
human language which IMO is not supported by facts.
Just because most linguists do not bother to pay attention to
this level of detail does not entail that what I said is not
logically entailed.
Linguists pay far more attention to far deeper levels of detail than are
dreamed of in your philosophy.
That is certainly the case. I am only focusing on the fundamental
architecture of the mathematical foundation of semantics.
Focusing on something nonexistent? Interesting.
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Since I can directly see how all natural language can be
encoded in the simple syntax of HOL specified by my
Minimal Type Theory, I see these things much more clearly.
You have still never addressed any "natural language" dealing with things
to which "Truth Value" is simply irrelevant.
The function is surjective (onto) if each element of the codomain is
mapped to by at least one element of the domain.
I am establishing the mathematical foundation of the surjective
mapping from natural language to its formalized equivalent.
Since the LHS of this mapping is entirely natural language I
have just proven that my work is related to natural language.
No idea what any of that gobbledygook means. Deal with the sentences I gave
you earlier for which Truth Value is irrelevant.
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
No one could explain to me how lambda calculus would encode
arithmetic using the ASCII digits.
Integers are represented in lambda calculus by the Church numerals.
Zero is represented by the lambda expression λfx.x, and other
integers are generated by the applying successor function λnfx.f(nfx)
to an existing integer n.
Is there anything in those two paragraphs about human language?
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
In such a theory don't imperatives also have such a
property?
No.
What property do imperatives have? (Do you know what "imperatives" are?)
peteolcott
2018-11-01 20:53:11 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Hence you must be saying that sentences have properties
and that declarative sentences have a Boolean property
you call True or False. This is a strong hypothesis about
human language which IMO is not supported by facts.
Just because most linguists do not bother to pay attention to
this level of detail does not entail that what I said is not
logically entailed.
Linguists pay far more attention to far deeper levels of detail than are
dreamed of in your philosophy.
That is certainly the case. I am only focusing on the fundamental
architecture of the mathematical foundation of semantics.
Focusing on something nonexistent? Interesting.
Since semantics applies to both formal and natural languages
and the formal semantics of formal languages is already specified
syntactically therefore some of the mathematical foundation of
semantics is proven to already exist.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-01 21:17:35 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Hence you must be saying that sentences have properties
and that declarative sentences have a Boolean property
you call True or False. This is a strong hypothesis about
human language which IMO is not supported by facts.
Just because most linguists do not bother to pay attention to
this level of detail does not entail that what I said is not
logically entailed.
Linguists pay far more attention to far deeper levels of detail than are
dreamed of in your philosophy.
That is certainly the case. I am only focusing on the fundamental
architecture of the mathematical foundation of semantics.
Focusing on something nonexistent? Interesting.
Since semantics applies to both formal and natural languages
and the formal semantics of formal languages is already specified
syntactically therefore some of the mathematical foundation of
semantics is proven to already exist.
And it has nothing to do with meaning as expressed in human language.
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-02 02:08:27 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Hence you must be saying that sentences have properties
and that declarative sentences have a Boolean property
you call True or False. This is a strong hypothesis about
human language which IMO is not supported by facts.
Just because most linguists do not bother to pay attention to
this level of detail does not entail that what I said is not
logically entailed.
Linguists pay far more attention to far deeper levels of detail than are
dreamed of in your philosophy.
That is certainly the case. I am only focusing on the fundamental
architecture of the mathematical foundation of semantics.
That's why what you do has nothing to do with linguistics.
In your mental jail, you seem unable to understand what linguistics is about.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-01 03:06:03 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
That statement seems quite absurd, thus you could only mean it
with some degree of subjective leeway of interpretation. If we
"a dog is not a type of cat" would be pure gibberish with
not the slightest nuance of a trace of any meaning what-so-ever.
What on earth does "Truth" have to do with the definitions of words?
The English word "Not" could not possibly have any semantic meaning
what-so-ever if English did not have the concept of {True} as an
aspect of the basis of the meaning of {Not}.
I observe that you deleted almost everything I wrote. Why?
peteolcott
2018-11-01 03:17:16 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
That statement seems quite absurd, thus you could only mean it
with some degree of subjective leeway of interpretation. If we
"a dog is not a type of cat" would be pure gibberish with
not the slightest nuance of a trace of any meaning what-so-ever.
What on earth does "Truth" have to do with the definitions of words?
The English word "Not" could not possibly have any semantic meaning
what-so-ever if English did not have the concept of {True} as an
aspect of the basis of the meaning of {Not}.
I observe that you deleted almost everything I wrote. Why?
I have limited time and have to focus on the most important things.
I should not have said all those things that you responded to.
peteolcott
2018-11-01 03:28:05 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
That statement seems quite absurd, thus you could only mean it
with some degree of subjective leeway of interpretation. If we
"a dog is not a type of cat" would be pure gibberish with
not the slightest nuance of a trace of any meaning what-so-ever.
What on earth does "Truth" have to do with the definitions of words?
The English word "Not" could not possibly have any semantic meaning
what-so-ever if English did not have the concept of {True} as an
aspect of the basis of the meaning of {Not}.
I observe that you deleted almost everything I wrote. Why?
I responded to the key most important point, my posts are relevant
to linguistics only because Truth is the anchor of all language.

https://linguistics.stackexchange.com/questions/21119/truth-conditional-semantics-and-wffs

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics

https://www.jstor.org/stable/20012129?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-01 16:35:26 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
That statement seems quite absurd, thus you could only mean it
with some degree of subjective leeway of interpretation. If we
"a dog is not a type of cat" would be pure gibberish with
not the slightest nuance of a trace of any meaning what-so-ever.
What on earth does "Truth" have to do with the definitions of words?
The English word "Not" could not possibly have any semantic meaning
what-so-ever if English did not have the concept of {True} as an
aspect of the basis of the meaning of {Not}.
I observe that you deleted almost everything I wrote. Why?
I responded to the key most important point, my posts are relevant
to linguistics only because Truth is the anchor of all language.
You didn't respond to any point that I made. You deleted the important
ones (all of them) because you cannot answer them.

What you are calling "linguistics" seems to be the "Truth Value" analysis
of simple declarative sentences. That has nothing to do with linguistics,
and you refuse even to consider utterances where "Truth Value" is simply
irrelevant.
Post by peteolcott
https://linguistics.stackexchange.com/questions/21119/truth-conditional-semantics-and-wffs
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20012129?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-01 13:38:46 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
Natural language has nothing to do with Truth.
yes, excellent point !

That's why Péter la Crotte is absolutely off the mark.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-10-31 19:59:07 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Thus both his and your messages about his do not belong in sci.lang.
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199541072.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199541072
The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality
Compositionality is a key concept in linguistics, the philosophy of mind and language, and throughout the cognitive sciences. Understanding how it works is a central element of syntactic and semantic analysis, and a challenge for models of cognition.
No one has suggested that you do linguistic compositionality. (I neither
know nor care whether you do any other kind of compositionality.) This
book is thus not evidence that your stuff belongs in sci.lang.
I am providing proof rather than evidence
The book is certainly not _proof_ that you are doing linguistics!
Post by peteolcott
that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth.
That is simply not True, as many people pointed out to you months ago.
Neither human language nor linguistics is concerned with Truth at all.
People talk about nonexistent things all the time. "All unicorns are
white" has no truth value whatsoever, but it is a perfect English sentence.
peteolcott
2018-10-31 20:29:38 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Thus both his and your messages about his do not belong in sci.lang.
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199541072.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199541072
The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality
Compositionality is a key concept in linguistics, the philosophy of mind and language, and throughout the cognitive sciences. Understanding how it works is a central element of syntactic and semantic analysis, and a challenge for models of cognition.
No one has suggested that you do linguistic compositionality. (I neither
know nor care whether you do any other kind of compositionality.) This
book is thus not evidence that your stuff belongs in sci.lang.
I am providing proof rather than evidence
The book is certainly not _proof_ that you are doing linguistics!
Post by peteolcott
that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth.
That is simply not True, as many people pointed out to you months ago.
Neither human language nor linguistics is concerned with Truth at all.
Then "a dog is not a type of cat" would be pure gibberish with
not the slightest nuance of any trace of meaning what-so-ever.
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-01 13:41:14 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Thus both his and your messages about his do not belong in sci.lang.
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199541072.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199541072
The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality
Compositionality is a key concept in linguistics, the philosophy of mind and language, and throughout the cognitive sciences. Understanding how it works is a central element of syntactic and semantic analysis, and a challenge for models of cognition.
No one has suggested that you do linguistic compositionality. (I neither
know nor care whether you do any other kind of compositionality.) This
book is thus not evidence that your stuff belongs in sci.lang.
I am providing proof rather than evidence that this thread does belong
in sci.lang. Both formal and natural language equally depend upon the
notion of Truth. I have specified the formalization of the specification
of Truth and its simple English equivalent. It seems that I may be able
to continue translating between the formal logic and its simple English
equivalent, thus everyone here may be able to join this dialogue.
What you hold as a proof is a proof of the contrary,
you understand nothing to what linguistics is about.
No line you wrote here makes any linguistic sense.
It's all about your Semantic garbage mental jail.
You're deadlocked in a maze of insane crap.
peteolcott
2018-10-31 15:20:58 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Franz Gnaedinger
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Peter Olcott knows the absolute and complete and total truth, ...
You were criticizing Peter Daniels the other day for what you claimed
to be lack of memory. Have you yourself forgotten how many times that
you have posted this exact same comment about Peter Olcott in recent
weeks? What good does it do to say the same thing over and over again?
Perhaps more important, you seem to have understood why Peter Olcott's
contributions are off-topic and worthless, but you seem not to have
understood that many of your criticisms of him apply just as well to
the garabage that you post over and over again.
First, I vary my comments, and second I have factual evidence that Allgod
is wrong, for he goes against P R O V E N theorems of mathematical logic.
Anyone understanding the following symbolic logic knows it proves I am correct:

LiarParadox ↔ LiarParadox ∈ F ~Theorem(F, LiarParadox)
If LiarParadox was a theorem of F this contradicts its assertion: ~Theorem(F, LiarParadox)
If ~LiarParadox was a theorem of F this contradicts its assertion: Theorem(F, LiarParadox)
∴ ~Boolean_Proposition(F, LiarParadox)

G ↔ G ∈ F ~Provable(F, G)
If G was a theorem of F this contradicts its assertion: ~Provable(F, G)
If ~G was a theorem of F this contradicts its assertion: Provable(F, G)
∴ ~Boolean_Proposition(F, G)

Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott

Although Franz is quite intelligent, any mindless idiot can say:
you are wrong, we know you are wrong because you are wrong.
Maybe David can actually examine the symbolic logic.
Post by Franz Gnaedinger
Do that and you are out, tilt, game over. There are no proven theorems in
linguistics, only better or lesser evidence. And I offer test cases, for
example my triple test case regarding the name of Zeus, the Indo-European
homeland, and words for the horse. You can't go for my test case, but you
can drop verdicts from above, so you are unable of discussing on the
scientific level. Goes without saying that Allgod offers no test case.
And you can't cope with him, nor with other posters of his caliber.
The kooks and hyperkooks observe the textbook fraction cloesely and see
how they fail, most always escaping to meta-levels because they lack
scientific arguments, and thus they feel confirmed.
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