Discussion:
Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem (as simple as possible)
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peteolcott
2018-11-04 05:31:22 UTC
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∃G (G ↔ ~Provable(G))
"there exists a proposition that is materially equivalent to a statement of its own unprovability."

If G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is not Provable.
If ~G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is Provable
Therefore G is neither Provable nor Refutable and does not exist.

Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-04 06:13:56 UTC
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Post by peteolcott
∃G (G ↔ ~Provable(G))
"there exists a proposition that is materially equivalent to a statement of its own unprovability."
If G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is not Provable.
If ~G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is Provable
Therefore G is neither Provable nor Refutable and does not exist.
Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
Please, avoid propagating this garbage on sci.lang
thanks.
Peter Percival
2018-11-04 11:07:13 UTC
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Post by peteolcott
∃G (G ↔ ~Provable(G))
"there exists a proposition that is materially equivalent to a statement
of its own unprovability."
When logicians write of something being provable they mean provable in
some theory. What theory does your Provable refer to?
Post by peteolcott
If G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is not Provable.
If ~G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is Provable
Therefore G is neither Provable nor Refutable and does not exist.
The Gödel sentence for an appropriate theory is indeed neither provable
nor refutable in that theory. Proofs of Gödel's theorem actually
exhibit the sentence (modulo a long list of definitions, else the
sentence would be inconveniently long), so that it exists can hardly be
doubted. It may be that you have a definition of formula or sentence or
something, which is such that only a provable or refutable expression
can be a one. But if so your definition of formula (or etc) is not the
usual one, and you have nothing to say about Gödel's *actual* theorem.

You have been told before (and isn't it obvious anyway?) that if some
claim is made about X defined in some way and you say that it isn't true
of X defined in some other way, you haven't thereby refuted the claim.
That you can't frame a coherent definition anyway just muddies the waters.
Post by peteolcott
Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-04 11:52:03 UTC
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Post by Peter Percival
Post by peteolcott
∃G (G ↔ ~Provable(G))
"there exists a proposition that is materially equivalent to a statement
of its own unprovability."
When logicians write of something being provable they mean provable in
some theory. What theory does your Provable refer to?
Post by peteolcott
If G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is not Provable.
If ~G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is Provable
Therefore G is neither Provable nor Refutable and does not exist.
The Gödel sentence for an appropriate theory is indeed neither provable
nor refutable in that theory. Proofs of Gödel's theorem actually
exhibit the sentence (modulo a long list of definitions, else the
sentence would be inconveniently long), so that it exists can hardly be
doubted. It may be that you have a definition of formula or sentence or
something, which is such that only a provable or refutable expression
can be a one. But if so your definition of formula (or etc) is not the
usual one, and you have nothing to say about Gödel's *actual* theorem.
You have been told before (and isn't it obvious anyway?) that if some
claim is made about X defined in some way and you say that it isn't true
of X defined in some other way, you haven't thereby refuted the claim.
That you can't frame a coherent definition anyway just muddies the waters.
Post by peteolcott
Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
Please, avoid propagating this garbage on sci.lang
thanks.
There's a maze of cross-posting metastases.
peteolcott
2018-11-05 15:12:32 UTC
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Post by peteolcott
∃G (G ↔ ~Provable(G))
"there exists a proposition that is materially equivalent to a statement of its own unprovability."
When logicians write of something being provable they mean provable in some theory.  What theory does your Provable refer to?
Post by peteolcott
If G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is not Provable.
If ~G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is Provable
Therefore G is neither Provable nor Refutable and does not exist.
The Gödel sentence for an appropriate theory is indeed neither provable nor refutable in that theory.
From this post:
[Refuting Incompleteness and Undefinability Version(13) (World class expert coaching)]

A world class expert provided some coaching. They have published very much
in the field of Incompleteness and many related fields.

They changed this:
∀F ∈ Formal_Systems (∃G ∈ F (G ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ F ~(Γ ⊢ G)))

into this:
L(F) means the language of formal system F.
∀F (F ∈ Formal_Systems & Q ⊆ F) → ∃G ∈ L(F) (G ↔ ~(F ⊢ G))
Q here is Robinson Arithmetic (the theorem fails for some weaker formal systems)

I realized that Q is not needed if the following expression evaluates to False:
∃F ∈ Formal_Systems ∃G ∈ L(F) (G ↔ ~(F ⊢ G))

There exists an F in formal systems
("there exists a proposition [G in the language of F] that is materially equivalent to a statement of its own unprovability.")

The following analysis seems to refute Gödel 1931 Incompleteness as long as the
term "satisfiable" is interpreted using the conventional meanings of the symbols
within symbolic logic.

If G was Provable in F this contradicts its assertion: G is not Provable in F
If ~G was Provable in F this contradicts its assertion: G is Provable in F.
Since G is neither Provable nor Refutable in F it forms a Gödel sentence in F.

Because G is not satisfiable in any Formal System F, the Gödel sentence does not exist.

Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
peteolcott
2018-11-05 16:16:23 UTC
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sci.lang removed
Post by peteolcott
Post by peteolcott
∃G (G ↔ ~Provable(G))
"there exists a proposition that is materially equivalent to a statement of its own unprovability."
When logicians write of something being provable they mean provable in some theory.  What theory does your Provable refer to?
I'd still like to know.
Post by peteolcott
Post by peteolcott
If G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is not Provable.
If ~G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is Provable
Therefore G is neither Provable nor Refutable and does not exist.
The Gödel sentence for an appropriate theory is indeed neither provable nor refutable in that theory.
[Refuting Incompleteness and Undefinability Version(13) (World class expert coaching)]
A world class expert provided some coaching. They have published very much
in the field of Incompleteness and many related fields.
∀F ∈ Formal_Systems (∃G ∈ F (G ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ F ~(Γ ⊢ G)))
L(F) means the language of formal system F.
∀F (F ∈ Formal_Systems & Q ⊆ F) → ∃G ∈ L(F) (G ↔ ~(F ⊢ G))
Q here is Robinson Arithmetic (the theorem fails for some weaker formal systems)
∃F ∈ Formal_Systems ∃G ∈ L(F) (G ↔ ~(F ⊢ G))
You need to sort out your notation.  This Γ ⊢ G seems to mean that formula G follows from set of formulae Γ.  (Follows from in FOL, in something else, who knows?)  And this F ⊢ G seems to mean G is a theorem of theory F.
You have to pay attention to all the updates in the order that they are presented:

This is the world class expert's formulation: ∀F (F ∈ Formal_Systems & Q ⊆ F) → ∃G ∈ L(F) (G ↔ ~(F ⊢ G))

This is my version(13) reformulation of the world class expert's formulation: ∃F ∈ Formal_Systems ∃G ∈ L(F) (G ↔ ~(F ⊢ G))

Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
Peter Percival
2018-11-05 16:49:23 UTC
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Post by peteolcott
You have to pay attention to all the updates in the order that they are
You need a Ron Ziegler to announce that previous announcements are
inoperative.
Post by peteolcott
This is the world class expert
Who s/he?
Post by peteolcott
's formulation: ∀F (F ∈ Formal_Systems & Q
⊆ F) → ∃G ∈ L(F) (G ↔ ~(F ⊢ G))
This is my version(13) reformulation of the world class expert's
formulation: ∃F ∈ Formal_Systems ∃G ∈ L(F) (G ↔ ~(F ⊢ G))
Who cares for your or their reformulation? Gödel's first incompleteness
theorem says what it says. If it's wrong then it's that very theorem
that's wrong, other things are irrelevant.
peteolcott
2018-11-04 15:00:32 UTC
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Post by peteolcott
∃G (G ↔ ~Provable(G))
"there exists a proposition that is materially equivalent to a statement of its own unprovability."
If G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is not Provable.
If ~G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is Provable
Therefore G is neither Provable nor Refutable and does not exist.
Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
This is relevant to linguistics exactly one way:

The Tarski Undefinability Theorem is based on the 1931 GIT and "proves"
that it is impossible to mathematically formalize the notion of True()
as a Boolean valued function of Math/Logic.

The foundation of the mathematical formalization of natural language
(formal semantics) requires the formal notion of True as its most
fundamental basis. All of the rest of the details of formal semantics
hang on this key missing piece.

Although it does not look like much here it is:
∀L ∈ Formal_System ∀x ∈ L (True(L,x) ↔ Theorem(L,x))

The only way that I can prove that the above formula is correct is to use
it to refute Gödel and Tarski.

The reason that I know that Gödel and Tarski are wrong is simply this:
If Gödel and Tarski are correct then the concept of Truth itself is broken.

Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-04 18:57:12 UTC
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Post by peteolcott
∃G (G ↔ ~Provable(G))
"there exists a proposition that is materially equivalent to a statement of its own unprovability."
If G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is not Provable.
If ~G was Provable this contradicts its assertion: G is Provable
Therefore G is neither Provable nor Refutable and does not exist.
Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-04 20:52:57 UTC
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Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" -- "How many times does it have to be
repeated to you that ..."

Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
DKleinecke
2018-11-04 21:38:03 UTC
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Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" -- "How many times does it have to be
repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
Like many things PO imagines his proposals to be
linguistic because he wishes to remodel natural language
into his computer-language-like ideal.

He points to what is called Formal Semantics (which seems
to be the descendant of Montague Grammar) as justifying
his opinions. So far no member of the small (?) Formal
Semantics community has spoken out about whether they
acknowledge what he does as authentic. His grasp of formal
logic is so weak that I doubt that they would.
Mścisław Wojna-Bojewski
2018-11-05 04:13:53 UTC
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Post by DKleinecke
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" -- "How many times does it have to be
repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
Like many things PO imagines his proposals to be
linguistic because he wishes to remodel natural language
into his computer-language-like ideal.
And people with background in maths or technology who think natural language should be remodelled into that kind of ideal are a dime a dozen.
peteolcott
2018-11-05 14:51:03 UTC
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Post by DKleinecke
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" -- "How many times does it have to be
repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
Like many things PO imagines his proposals to be
linguistic because he wishes to remodel natural language
into his computer-language-like ideal.
See the Tarski Undefinability proof on pages 275-276
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf

AI can never make very much progress Until Tarski Undefinability is refuted and a mathematical model of ∀x True(x) is completed.

True(x) is the ultimate anchor of all truth conditional semantics.

Truth conditional semantics unifies the formalization of natural language semantics into one a single goal.

Since Tarski Undefinability is based on Gödel Incompleteness refuting either one refutes them both.

A world class expert coached me on adapting my very simple formal expression
of the 1931 incompleteness theorem so that it would be clearer and more correct.

They added the qualification that F must be at least as expressive as Robinson arithmetic.

See: [Refuting Incompleteness and Undefinability Version(13) (World class expert coaching)]
This may be my final correct refutation of Gödel's 1931 Incompleteness Theorem.
Post by DKleinecke
He points to what is called Formal Semantics (which seems
to be the descendant of Montague Grammar) as justifying
his opinions. So far no member of the small (?) Formal
Semantics community has spoken out about whether they
acknowledge what he does as authentic. His grasp of formal
logic is so weak that I doubt that they would.
The formal semantics of linguistics merely has to work consistently and correctly there is no requirement that it be based on anything besides this.

Until ∀x True(x) is formalized consistently and correctly there is no hope of formalizing natural language consistent and correctly.

Only these guys are going in the right direction
https://www.cyc.com/

All of the rest of AI research it focusing on making systems that are great at playing video games and clueless about the meaning of words.
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem/

Even IBM's Watson only could make educated guesses and had no deep understanding.
http://techland.time.com/2011/02/16/why-did-watson-think-toronto-is-a-u-s-city-on-jeopardy/
DKleinecke
2018-11-05 18:44:40 UTC
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Post by peteolcott
AI can never make very much progress Until Tarski Undefinability is refuted and a mathematical model of ∀x True(x) is completed.
True(x) is the ultimate anchor of all truth conditional semantics.
Truth conditional semantics unifies the formalization of natural language semantics into one a single goal.
AI is NOT the goal of linguistics. Truth conditional semantics
is NOT the semantics of human speech. Formalization is NOT the
goal of linguistics.
peteolcott
2018-11-06 18:32:13 UTC
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Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
AI can never make very much progress Until Tarski Undefinability is refuted and a mathematical model of ∀x True(x) is completed.
True(x) is the ultimate anchor of all truth conditional semantics.
Truth conditional semantics unifies the formalization of natural language semantics into one a single goal.
AI is NOT the goal of linguistics. Truth conditional semantics
is NOT the semantics of human speech. Formalization is NOT the
goal of linguistics.
How many times do I have to prove that you are wrong about this?

https://academic.oup.com/jos
DKleinecke
2018-11-06 19:15:53 UTC
Reply
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Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
AI can never make very much progress Until Tarski Undefinability is refuted and a mathematical model of ∀x True(x) is completed.
True(x) is the ultimate anchor of all truth conditional semantics.
Truth conditional semantics unifies the formalization of natural language semantics into one a single goal.
AI is NOT the goal of linguistics. Truth conditional semantics
is NOT the semantics of human speech. Formalization is NOT the
goal of linguistics.
How many times do I have to prove that you are wrong about this?
https://academic.oup.com/jos
From the web page you link to -

Journal of Semantics covers all areas in the study of
meaning, with a focus on formal and experimental methods.
It welcomes submissions on semantics, pragmatics,
the syntax/semantics interface, cross-linguistic
semantics, experimental studies of meaning, and
semantically informed philosophy of language.

I see no mention of AI, truth conditional semantics or
Formalization. "Formal methods" is not a synonym
of formalization.

Anyway the theory of meaning is not part of
linguistics nor vice versa. They do overlap
somewhat.
peteolcott
2018-11-06 19:58:45 UTC
Reply
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Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
AI can never make very much progress Until Tarski Undefinability is refuted and a mathematical model of ∀x True(x) is completed.
True(x) is the ultimate anchor of all truth conditional semantics.
Truth conditional semantics unifies the formalization of natural language semantics into one a single goal.
AI is NOT the goal of linguistics. Truth conditional semantics
is NOT the semantics of human speech. Formalization is NOT the
goal of linguistics.
How many times do I have to prove that you are wrong about this?
https://academic.oup.com/jos
From the web page you link to -
Journal of Semantics covers all areas in the study of
meaning, with a focus on formal and experimental methods.
It welcomes submissions on semantics, pragmatics,
the syntax/semantics interface, cross-linguistic
semantics, experimental studies of meaning, and
semantically informed philosophy of language.
I see no mention of AI, truth conditional semantics or
Formalization. "Formal methods" is not a synonym
of formalization.
Anyway the theory of meaning is not part of
linguistics nor vice versa. They do overlap
somewhat.
You did not bother to pay attention:
meaning, with a focus on FORMAL and experimental methods.

A keyword search[truth conditional semantics]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics

Give it up man, the mathematical formalization of natural language
semantics IS LINGUISTICS, get over it already.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-06 20:30:59 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
AI can never make very much progress Until Tarski Undefinability is refuted and a mathematical model of ∀x True(x) is completed.
True(x) is the ultimate anchor of all truth conditional semantics.
Truth conditional semantics unifies the formalization of natural language semantics into one a single goal.
AI is NOT the goal of linguistics. Truth conditional semantics
is NOT the semantics of human speech. Formalization is NOT the
goal of linguistics.
How many times do I have to prove that you are wrong about this?
https://academic.oup.com/jos
From the web page you link to -
"Journal of Semantics covers all areas in the study of
meaning, with a focus on formal and experimental methods.
It welcomes submissions on semantics, pragmatics,
the syntax/semantics interface, cross-linguistic
semantics, experimental studies of meaning, and
semantically informed philosophy of language."
I see no mention of AI, truth conditional semantics or
Formalization. "Formal methods" is not a synonym
of formalization.
Anyway the theory of meaning is not part of
linguistics nor vice versa. They do overlap
somewhat.
meaning, with a focus on FORMAL and experimental methods.
A keyword search[truth conditional semantics]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics
Give it up man, the mathematical formalization of natural language
semantics IS LINGUISTICS, get over it already.
Merely a branch of linguistics that no linguist has ever engaged in?
peteolcott
2018-11-07 01:43:39 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
AI can never make very much progress Until Tarski Undefinability is refuted and a mathematical model of ∀x True(x) is completed.
True(x) is the ultimate anchor of all truth conditional semantics.
Truth conditional semantics unifies the formalization of natural language semantics into one a single goal.
AI is NOT the goal of linguistics. Truth conditional semantics
is NOT the semantics of human speech. Formalization is NOT the
goal of linguistics.
How many times do I have to prove that you are wrong about this?
https://academic.oup.com/jos
From the web page you link to -
"Journal of Semantics covers all areas in the study of
meaning, with a focus on formal and experimental methods.
It welcomes submissions on semantics, pragmatics,
the syntax/semantics interface, cross-linguistic
semantics, experimental studies of meaning, and
semantically informed philosophy of language."
I see no mention of AI, truth conditional semantics or
Formalization. "Formal methods" is not a synonym
of formalization.
Anyway the theory of meaning is not part of
linguistics nor vice versa. They do overlap
somewhat.
meaning, with a focus on FORMAL and experimental methods.
A keyword search[truth conditional semantics]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics
Give it up man, the mathematical formalization of natural language
semantics IS LINGUISTICS, get over it already.
Merely a branch of linguistics that no linguist has ever engaged in?
Psychological denial does not count as a correct rebuttal.
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-07 07:14:54 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
AI can never make very much progress Until Tarski Undefinability is refuted and a mathematical model of ∀x True(x) is completed.
True(x) is the ultimate anchor of all truth conditional semantics.
Truth conditional semantics unifies the formalization of natural language semantics into one a single goal.
AI is NOT the goal of linguistics. Truth conditional semantics
is NOT the semantics of human speech. Formalization is NOT the
goal of linguistics.
How many times do I have to prove that you are wrong about this?
https://academic.oup.com/jos
From the web page you link to -
"Journal of Semantics covers all areas in the study of
meaning, with a focus on formal and experimental methods.
It welcomes submissions on semantics, pragmatics,
the syntax/semantics interface, cross-linguistic
semantics, experimental studies of meaning, and
semantically informed philosophy of language."
I see no mention of AI, truth conditional semantics or
Formalization. "Formal methods" is not a synonym
of formalization.
Anyway the theory of meaning is not part of
linguistics nor vice versa. They do overlap
somewhat.
meaning, with a focus on FORMAL and experimental methods.
A keyword search[truth conditional semantics]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics
Give it up man, the mathematical formalization of natural language
semantics IS LINGUISTICS, get over it already.
Merely a branch of linguistics that no linguist has ever engaged in?
Psychological denial does not count as a correct rebuttal.
Go get yourself a mirror.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-07 13:34:21 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
AI can never make very much progress Until Tarski Undefinability is refuted and a mathematical model of ∀x True(x) is completed.
True(x) is the ultimate anchor of all truth conditional semantics.
Truth conditional semantics unifies the formalization of natural language semantics into one a single goal.
AI is NOT the goal of linguistics. Truth conditional semantics
is NOT the semantics of human speech. Formalization is NOT the
goal of linguistics.
How many times do I have to prove that you are wrong about this?
https://academic.oup.com/jos
From the web page you link to -
"Journal of Semantics covers all areas in the study of
meaning, with a focus on formal and experimental methods.
It welcomes submissions on semantics, pragmatics,
the syntax/semantics interface, cross-linguistic
semantics, experimental studies of meaning, and
semantically informed philosophy of language."
I see no mention of AI, truth conditional semantics or
Formalization. "Formal methods" is not a synonym
of formalization.
Anyway the theory of meaning is not part of
linguistics nor vice versa. They do overlap
somewhat.
meaning, with a focus on FORMAL and experimental methods.
A keyword search[truth conditional semantics]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics
Give it up man, the mathematical formalization of natural language
semantics IS LINGUISTICS, get over it already.
Merely a branch of linguistics that no linguist has ever engaged in?
Psychological denial does not count as a correct rebuttal.
Okay, smarty-pants, name a linguist who has engaged in it.

NB Richard Montague is not a linguist.

In case you still haven't got it, his attempts were weighed in the balance
and found wanting.
peteolcott
2018-11-07 16:21:11 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
meaning, with a focus on FORMAL and experimental methods.
A keyword search[truth conditional semantics]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics
Give it up man, the mathematical formalization of natural language
semantics IS LINGUISTICS, get over it already.
Merely a branch of linguistics that no linguist has ever engaged in?
Psychological denial does not count as a correct rebuttal.
Okay, smarty-pants, name a linguist who has engaged in it.
NB Richard Montague is not a linguist.
In case you still haven't got it, his attempts were weighed in the balance
and found wanting.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics
Truth-conditional semantics is an approach to semantics of natural language that sees meaning (or at least the meaning of assertions) as being the same as, or reducible to, their truth conditions. This approach to semantics is principally associated with
Donald Davidson, and attempts to carry out for the semantics of natural language what Tarski's semantic theory of truth achieves for the semantics of logic (Davidson 1967).

Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1

My completion of Tarski's 1933 formula that he "proves" impossible to complete in 1936 finally fully anchors the whole notion of [Truth Conditional Semantics] in logic.
∀x True(x) ↔ φ(x) // Tarski 1933
∀x True(x) ↔ ⊢x // Pete Olcott 2018

For non-logician linguists the above mathematical formalism could be approximately construed as: A declarative sentence is true if and only if it can be proven true entirely on the basis of established facts.

The only reason that I refer to Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem, is that its refutation by a version of my formula proves the correctness of my formula.

It is easier to refute Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness than it is to refute Tarski's 1936 Undefinability because logicians accept and understand the notion of provability much better than they accept and understand the notion of a Truth predicate.


Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
peteolcott
2018-11-07 18:30:08 UTC
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Post by peteolcott
∀x True(x) ↔ ⊢x // Pete Olcott 2018
For non-logician linguists the above mathematical formalism could be approximately construed as: A declarative sentence is true if and only if it can be proven true entirely on the basis of established facts.
That is a lie. It says nothing of the sort.
It says that there is a predicate in the current formal system (that you haven't specified yet) that corresponds exactly to theoremhood in that formal system. In other words, it's a relabelling of theoremhood. Nothing more, nothing less.
Your ∀x True(x) <-> ⊢x would be no more or less correct if you wrote it as ∀x Qwyjibo(x) <-> ⊢x or ∀x Fuzzy(x) <-> ⊢x or ∀x Peter_Olcott_is_a_Dumbass(x) <-> ⊢x.
LABELS ARE NOT MEANINGS! Labelling something as "True()" doesn't magically make it have anything at all to do with actual truth.
EFQ
All of your reasoning is correct, and none of your reasoning contradicts what I said at all.

The key point of my reasoning is that ∀x True(x) ↔ ⊢x does correctly complete what
Tarski meant by True(x), thus contradicting his 1936 Undefinability Theorem.

I could directly rebut his original proof, but philosophy of logic does not seem to be your forte.

Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
Peter Percival
2018-11-07 18:49:00 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
∀x True(x) ↔ ⊢x    // Pete Olcott 2018
For non-logician linguists the above mathematical formalism could be
approximately construed as: A declarative sentence is true if and
only if it can be proven true entirely on the basis of established
facts.
That is a lie. It says nothing of the sort.
It says that there is a predicate in the current formal system (that
you haven't specified yet) that corresponds exactly to theoremhood in
that formal system. In other words, it's a relabelling of theoremhood.
Nothing more, nothing less.
it as ∀x Qwyjibo(x) <-> ⊢x or ∀x Fuzzy(x) <-> ⊢x or ∀x
Peter_Olcott_is_a_Dumbass(x) <-> ⊢x.
LABELS ARE NOT MEANINGS! Labelling something as "True()" doesn't
magically make it have anything at all to do with actual truth.
EFQ
All of your reasoning is correct, and none of your reasoning contradicts
what I said at all.
The key point of my reasoning is that ∀x True(x) ↔ ⊢x does correctly complete what
Tarski meant by True(x), thus contradicting his 1936 Undefinability Theorem.
I could directly rebut his original proof
When a nutter claims that some famous theorem is false, I often ask
where is the first error in the original paper, or any other paper or
any text-book proof. If they respond at all it is to claim that they
don't need to. Please begin by identifying 'his 1936 Undefinability
Theorem'
and then identify the first error.
Post by peteolcott
, but philosophy of logic does
not seem to be your forte.
What have you read, and what courses have you attended, to learn about
philosophy of logic?
Post by peteolcott
Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
--
"He who will not reason is a bigot;
he who cannot is a fool;
he who dares not is a slave."
- Sir William Drummond
peteolcott
2018-11-07 21:50:41 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
∀x True(x) ↔ ⊢x    // Pete Olcott 2018
For non-logician linguists the above mathematical formalism could be approximately construed as: A declarative sentence is true if and only if it can be proven true entirely on the basis of established facts.
That is a lie. It says nothing of the sort.
It says that there is a predicate in the current formal system (that you haven't specified yet) that corresponds exactly to theoremhood in that formal system. In other words, it's a relabelling of theoremhood. Nothing more, nothing less.
Your ∀x True(x) <-> ⊢x would be no more or less correct if you wrote it as ∀x Qwyjibo(x) <-> ⊢x or ∀x Fuzzy(x) <-> ⊢x or ∀x Peter_Olcott_is_a_Dumbass(x) <-> ⊢x.
LABELS ARE NOT MEANINGS! Labelling something as "True()" doesn't magically make it have anything at all to do with actual truth.
EFQ
All of your reasoning is correct, and none of your reasoning contradicts what I said at all.
The key point of my reasoning is that ∀x True(x) ↔ ⊢x does correctly complete what
Tarski meant by True(x), thus contradicting his 1936 Undefinability Theorem.
I could directly rebut his original proof
When a nutter claims that some famous theorem is false, I often ask where is the first error in the original paper, or any other paper or any text-book proof.  If they respond at all it is to claim that they don't need to.  Please begin by identifying 'his
1936 Undefinability Theorem'
 and then identify the first error.
Pages 275-276 is a proof that is 10,000-fold simpler than the 1931 GIT.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf

He does not show that Truth is Undefinable, he only shows if that if Provability is Incomplete then Truth is Undefinable.

As long as the final conclusion of any formal proof is proved to be
contradicted all of the convoluted reasoning that formed the basis
for this refuted conclusion becomes totally moot.

http://liarparadox.org/index.php/2018/11/04/godels-1931-incompleteness-theorem-as-simple-as-possible/

His Undefinability totally depends upon Incompleteness which I have just refuted.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-07 18:50:06 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
meaning, with a focus on FORMAL and experimental methods.
A keyword search[truth conditional semantics]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics
Give it up man, the mathematical formalization of natural language
semantics IS LINGUISTICS, get over it already.
Merely a branch of linguistics that no linguist has ever engaged in?
Psychological denial does not count as a correct rebuttal.
Okay, smarty-pants, name a linguist who has engaged in it.
NB Richard Montague is not a linguist.
In case you still haven't got it, his attempts were weighed in the balance
and found wanting.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics
Truth-conditional semantics is an approach to semantics of natural language that sees meaning (or at least the meaning of assertions) as being the same as, or reducible to, their truth conditions. This approach to semantics is principally associated with
Donald Davidson, and attempts to carry out for the semantics of natural language what Tarski's semantic theory of truth achieves for the semantics of logic (Davidson 1967).
Donald Davidson isn't a linguist, either. He's a philosopher.

His contributions about the philosophy of meaning -- "Meaning" used to be
the domain of philosophy exclusively -- were taken into account in early
work on the semantics of natural language. Somehow I doubt you'd place
yourself in the tradition of Gilbert Ryle.
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-07 22:14:37 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
meaning, with a focus on FORMAL and experimental methods.
A keyword search[truth conditional semantics]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics
Give it up man, the mathematical formalization of natural language
semantics IS LINGUISTICS, get over it already.
Merely a branch of linguistics that no linguist has ever engaged in?
Psychological denial does not count as a correct rebuttal.
Okay, smarty-pants, name a linguist who has engaged in it.
NB Richard Montague is not a linguist.
In case you still haven't got it, his attempts were weighed in the balance
and found wanting.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics
Truth-conditional semantics is an approach to semantics of natural language that sees meaning (or at least the meaning of assertions) as being the same as, or reducible to, their truth conditions. This approach to semantics is principally associated with
Donald Davidson, and attempts to carry out for the semantics of natural language what Tarski's semantic theory of truth achieves for the semantics of logic (Davidson 1967).
Donald Davidson isn't a linguist, either. He's a philosopher.
His contributions about the philosophy of meaning -- "Meaning" used to be
the domain of philosophy exclusively -- were taken into account in early
work on the semantics of natural language. Somehow I doubt you'd place
yourself in the tradition of Gilbert Ryle.
All this crap is unrelated with linguistics.
peteolcott
2018-11-08 02:00:00 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
meaning, with a focus on FORMAL and experimental methods.
A keyword search[truth conditional semantics]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics
Give it up man, the mathematical formalization of natural language
semantics IS LINGUISTICS, get over it already.
Merely a branch of linguistics that no linguist has ever engaged in?
Psychological denial does not count as a correct rebuttal.
Okay, smarty-pants, name a linguist who has engaged in it.
NB Richard Montague is not a linguist.
In case you still haven't got it, his attempts were weighed in the balance
and found wanting.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics
Truth-conditional semantics is an approach to semantics of natural language that sees meaning (or at least the meaning of assertions) as being the same as, or reducible to, their truth conditions. This approach to semantics is principally associated with
Donald Davidson, and attempts to carry out for the semantics of natural language what Tarski's semantic theory of truth achieves for the semantics of logic (Davidson 1967).
Donald Davidson isn't a linguist, either. He's a philosopher.
His contributions about the philosophy of meaning -- "Meaning" used to be
the domain of philosophy exclusively -- were taken into account in early
work on the semantics of natural language. Somehow I doubt you'd place
yourself in the tradition of Gilbert Ryle.
So you are doing the same dishonest crap that others are doing.
I prove my point, you chop out this proof and then form a rebuttal on what remains.

These guys are linguists and all their articles are based on Davidson's
Truth conditional semantics, thus proving that formalization derives the
foundation of their papers:

Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-08 04:14:22 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
meaning, with a focus on FORMAL and experimental methods.
A keyword search[truth conditional semantics]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics
Give it up man, the mathematical formalization of natural language
semantics IS LINGUISTICS, get over it already.
Merely a branch of linguistics that no linguist has ever engaged in?
Psychological denial does not count as a correct rebuttal.
Okay, smarty-pants, name a linguist who has engaged in it.
NB Richard Montague is not a linguist.
In case you still haven't got it, his attempts were weighed in the balance
and found wanting.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics
Truth-conditional semantics is an approach to semantics of natural language that sees meaning (or at least the meaning of assertions) as being the same as, or reducible to, their truth conditions. This approach to semantics is principally associated with
Donald Davidson, and attempts to carry out for the semantics of natural language what Tarski's semantic theory of truth achieves for the semantics of logic (Davidson 1967).
Donald Davidson isn't a linguist, either. He's a philosopher.
His contributions about the philosophy of meaning -- "Meaning" used to be
the domain of philosophy exclusively -- were taken into account in early
work on the semantics of natural language. Somehow I doubt you'd place
yourself in the tradition of Gilbert Ryle.
So you are doing the same dishonest crap that others are doing.
I prove my point, you chop out this proof and then form a rebuttal on what remains.
These guys are linguists and all their articles are based on Davidson's
Truth conditional semantics, thus proving that formalization derives the
Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
Since all that leads to is a bunch of titles in a shopping cart, with a
few lines from an abstract, and no hint of who any of the authors are,
I have no way of knowing what their articles are about. If they are about
Tarski and Goedel, then they're not linguistics. If they're about linguistics,
then they're not about what you do.

Have you ever looked in an actual linguistics journal?
peteolcott
2018-11-08 04:25:24 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
meaning, with a focus on FORMAL and experimental methods.
A keyword search[truth conditional semantics]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics
Give it up man, the mathematical formalization of natural language
semantics IS LINGUISTICS, get over it already.
Merely a branch of linguistics that no linguist has ever engaged in?
Psychological denial does not count as a correct rebuttal.
Okay, smarty-pants, name a linguist who has engaged in it.
NB Richard Montague is not a linguist.
In case you still haven't got it, his attempts were weighed in the balance
and found wanting.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics
Truth-conditional semantics is an approach to semantics of natural language that sees meaning (or at least the meaning of assertions) as being the same as, or reducible to, their truth conditions. This approach to semantics is principally associated with
Donald Davidson, and attempts to carry out for the semantics of natural language what Tarski's semantic theory of truth achieves for the semantics of logic (Davidson 1967).
Donald Davidson isn't a linguist, either. He's a philosopher.
His contributions about the philosophy of meaning -- "Meaning" used to be
the domain of philosophy exclusively -- were taken into account in early
work on the semantics of natural language. Somehow I doubt you'd place
yourself in the tradition of Gilbert Ryle.
So you are doing the same dishonest crap that others are doing.
I prove my point, you chop out this proof and then form a rebuttal on what remains.
These guys are linguists and all their articles are based on Davidson's
Truth conditional semantics, thus proving that formalization derives the
Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
Since all that leads to is a bunch of titles in a shopping cart, with a
few lines from an abstract, and no hint of who any of the authors are,
I have no way of knowing what their articles are about. If they are about
Tarski and Goedel, then they're not linguistics. If they're about linguistics,
then they're not about what you do.
Have you ever looked in an actual linguistics journal?
You can tell two things from their abstracts:
(1) They use speak linguist
(2) They refer to Truth Conditional semantics that is anchored in logic

So unless you are dishonest it is clear to see that some aspects of
linguistics are anchored in logic, thus forming a cross disciplinary bridge.
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-08 07:39:29 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
meaning, with a focus on FORMAL and experimental methods.
A keyword search[truth conditional semantics]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics
Give it up man, the mathematical formalization of natural language
semantics IS LINGUISTICS, get over it already.
Merely a branch of linguistics that no linguist has ever engaged in?
Psychological denial does not count as a correct rebuttal.
Okay, smarty-pants, name a linguist who has engaged in it.
NB Richard Montague is not a linguist.
In case you still haven't got it, his attempts were weighed in the balance
and found wanting.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics
Truth-conditional semantics is an approach to semantics of natural language that sees meaning (or at least the meaning of assertions) as being the same as, or reducible to, their truth conditions. This approach to semantics is principally associated with
Donald Davidson, and attempts to carry out for the semantics of natural language what Tarski's semantic theory of truth achieves for the semantics of logic (Davidson 1967).
Donald Davidson isn't a linguist, either. He's a philosopher.
His contributions about the philosophy of meaning -- "Meaning" used to be
the domain of philosophy exclusively -- were taken into account in early
work on the semantics of natural language. Somehow I doubt you'd place
yourself in the tradition of Gilbert Ryle.
So you are doing the same dishonest crap that others are doing.
I prove my point, you chop out this proof and then form a rebuttal on what remains.
These guys are linguists and all their articles are based on Davidson's
Truth conditional semantics, thus proving that formalization derives the
Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
Since all that leads to is a bunch of titles in a shopping cart, with a
few lines from an abstract, and no hint of who any of the authors are,
I have no way of knowing what their articles are about. If they are about
Tarski and Goedel, then they're not linguistics. If they're about linguistics,
then they're not about what you do.
Have you ever looked in an actual linguistics journal?
(1) They use speak linguist
(2) They refer to Truth Conditional semantics that is anchored in logic
So unless you are dishonest it is clear to see that some aspects of
linguistics are anchored in logic, thus forming a cross disciplinary bridge.
You are constantly confusing linguistics and semantics.
Semantics is not a subfield of linguistics, it's another field, and one can do fine linguistics without caring about semantics.
Your "theory", if it's a theory, is a kind of fringe semantics thing, you are completely out of linguistics.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-08 12:28:14 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
These guys are linguists and all their articles are based on Davidson's
Truth conditional semantics, thus proving that formalization derives the
Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
Since all that leads to is a bunch of titles in a shopping cart, with a
few lines from an abstract, and no hint of who any of the authors are,
I have no way of knowing what their articles are about. If they are about
Tarski and Goedel, then they're not linguistics. If they're about linguistics,
then they're not about what you do.
Have you ever looked in an actual linguistics journal?
(1) They use speak linguist
Hunh?
Post by peteolcott
(2) They refer to Truth Conditional semantics that is anchored in logic
If we could see that, we would know they're not doing linguistics.
Post by peteolcott
So unless you are dishonest it is clear to see that some aspects of
linguistics are anchored in logic, thus forming a cross disciplinary bridge.
Since you know nothing of linguistics, it's hard to see how you can
justify such a claim.

Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
Ruud Harmsen
2018-11-08 12:51:31 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 04:28:14 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
Franz did!

J.P. Mallory & D.Q. Adams, 2006, The Oxford Introduction to
Proto-Indo-European and the Proto-Indo-European World
--
Ruud Harmsen, http://rudhar.com
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-08 13:50:23 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 04:28:14 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
Franz did!
J.P. Mallory & D.Q. Adams, 2006, The Oxford Introduction to
Proto-Indo-European and the Proto-Indo-European World
What does Franz have to do with Olcott?
Ruud Harmsen
2018-11-08 16:47:59 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 05:50:23 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 04:28:14 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
Franz did!
J.P. Mallory & D.Q. Adams, 2006, The Oxford Introduction to
Proto-Indo-European and the Proto-Indo-European World
What does Franz have to do with Olcott?
I don't know, you tabled it.
--
Ruud Harmsen, http://rudhar.com
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-08 21:21:06 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 05:50:23 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 04:28:14 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
Franz did!
J.P. Mallory & D.Q. Adams, 2006, The Oxford Introduction to
Proto-Indo-European and the Proto-Indo-European World
What does Franz have to do with Olcott?
I don't know, you tabled it.
What does "you tabled it" mean?

Whatever it means, how did I do it?

Why would you respond to a request to Pete Olcott with a note about Franz?
Ruud Harmsen
2018-11-09 06:49:15 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 13:21:06 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 05:50:23 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 04:28:14 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
Franz did!
J.P. Mallory & D.Q. Adams, 2006, The Oxford Introduction to
Proto-Indo-European and the Proto-Indo-European World
What does Franz have to do with Olcott?
I don't know, you tabled it.
What does "you tabled it" mean?
Look it up in a dictionary. It has different meanings both sides of
the pond, I can never remember which is where.
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Whatever it means, how did I do it?
That depends on the meaning.
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Why would you respond to a request to Pete Olcott with a note about Franz?
This is Usenet, this is sci.lang.
--
Ruud Harmsen, http://rudhar.com
Ruud Harmsen
2018-11-09 06:51:51 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 13:21:06 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 05:50:23 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 04:28:14 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
Franz did!
J.P. Mallory & D.Q. Adams, 2006, The Oxford Introduction to
Proto-Indo-European and the Proto-Indo-European World
What does Franz have to do with Olcott?
I don't know, you tabled it.
What does "you tabled it" mean?
Look it up in a dictionary. It has different meanings both sides of
the pond, I can never remember which is where.
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/table
Sense 3, not 4.
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Whatever it means, how did I do it?
That depends on the meaning.
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Why would you respond to a request to Pete Olcott with a note about Franz?
This is Usenet, this is sci.lang.
--
Ruud Harmsen, http://rudhar.com
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-09 13:41:44 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 13:21:06 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 05:50:23 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 04:28:14 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
Franz did!
J.P. Mallory & D.Q. Adams, 2006, The Oxford Introduction to
Proto-Indo-European and the Proto-Indo-European World
What does Franz have to do with Olcott?
I don't know, you tabled it.
What does "you tabled it" mean?
Look it up in a dictionary. It has different meanings both sides of
the pond, I can never remember which is where.
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Whatever it means, how did I do it?
That depends on the meaning.
So you don't know what you meant when you said it?

How are you better than Olcott, then?
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Why would you respond to a request to Pete Olcott with a note about Franz?
This is Usenet, this is sci.lang.
Which used to be fairly sane.
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-08 18:23:29 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Ruud Harmsen
Thu, 8 Nov 2018 04:28:14 -0800 (PST): "Peter T. Daniels"
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
Franz did!
J.P. Mallory & D.Q. Adams, 2006, The Oxford Introduction to
Proto-Indo-European and the Proto-Indo-European World
--
Franz is learnable !
Halleluyah !
peteolcott
2018-11-08 17:07:11 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
These guys are linguists and all their articles are based on Davidson's
Truth conditional semantics, thus proving that formalization derives the
Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
Since all that leads to is a bunch of titles in a shopping cart, with a
few lines from an abstract, and no hint of who any of the authors are,
I have no way of knowing what their articles are about. If they are about
Tarski and Goedel, then they're not linguistics. If they're about linguistics,
then they're not about what you do.
Have you ever looked in an actual linguistics journal?
(1) They use speak linguist
Hunh?
Typo
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
(2) They refer to Truth Conditional semantics that is anchored in logic
If we could see that, we would know they're not doing linguistics.
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
So unless you are dishonest it is clear to see that some aspects of
linguistics are anchored in logic, thus forming a cross disciplinary bridge.
Since you know nothing of linguistics, it's hard to see how you can
justify such a claim.
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
That is a pretty stupid question when I posted this link:
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
DKleinecke
2018-11-08 18:00:17 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
These guys are linguists and all their articles are based on Davidson's
Truth conditional semantics, thus proving that formalization derives the
Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
Since all that leads to is a bunch of titles in a shopping cart, with a
few lines from an abstract, and no hint of who any of the authors are,
I have no way of knowing what their articles are about. If they are about
Tarski and Goedel, then they're not linguistics. If they're about linguistics,
then they're not about what you do.
Have you ever looked in an actual linguistics journal?
(1) They use speak linguist
Hunh?
Typo
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
(2) They refer to Truth Conditional semantics that is anchored in logic
If we could see that, we would know they're not doing linguistics.
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
So unless you are dishonest it is clear to see that some aspects of
linguistics are anchored in logic, thus forming a cross disciplinary bridge.
Since you know nothing of linguistics, it's hard to see how you can
justify such a claim.
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
You did a search on "truth condition" in the Journal
of Semantics. Have you read any of the abstracts that
that search located or perhaps even one of the articles?

A "field of study" called truth conditional semantics exists.
It is a sub-field of philosophy and has little relation to
linguistics.

The main defect of truth conditional semantics from a
linguistic POV is that it only applies to a subset of
declarative sentences. A corollary defect is that what
it does with those sentences sheds no light on the
questions about syntax etc. that linguists ask.
peteolcott
2018-11-08 19:40:41 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
These guys are linguists and all their articles are based on Davidson's
Truth conditional semantics, thus proving that formalization derives the
Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
Since all that leads to is a bunch of titles in a shopping cart, with a
few lines from an abstract, and no hint of who any of the authors are,
I have no way of knowing what their articles are about. If they are about
Tarski and Goedel, then they're not linguistics. If they're about linguistics,
then they're not about what you do.
Have you ever looked in an actual linguistics journal?
(1) They use speak linguist
Hunh?
Typo
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
(2) They refer to Truth Conditional semantics that is anchored in logic
If we could see that, we would know they're not doing linguistics.
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
So unless you are dishonest it is clear to see that some aspects of
linguistics are anchored in logic, thus forming a cross disciplinary bridge.
Since you know nothing of linguistics, it's hard to see how you can
justify such a claim.
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
You did a search on "truth condition" in the Journal
of Semantics. Have you read any of the abstracts that
that search located or perhaps even one of the articles?
A "field of study" called truth conditional semantics exists.
It is a sub-field of philosophy and has little relation to
linguistics.
The main defect of truth conditional semantics from a
linguistic POV is that it only applies to a subset of
declarative sentences.
Finally you get specific. How is it only a subset?
Post by DKleinecke
A corollary defect is that what
it does with those sentences sheds no light on the
questions about syntax etc. that linguists ask.
Of course it is not going to answer syntax questions when it is
only addressing the semantics aspects. Although the syntax of
semantics can be formalized in HOL the syntax of linguistics
is not referring to the syntax of semantics, these two are
mutually exclusive.
DKleinecke
2018-11-08 19:59:23 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
These guys are linguists and all their articles are based on Davidson's
Truth conditional semantics, thus proving that formalization derives the
Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
Since all that leads to is a bunch of titles in a shopping cart, with a
few lines from an abstract, and no hint of who any of the authors are,
I have no way of knowing what their articles are about. If they are about
Tarski and Goedel, then they're not linguistics. If they're about linguistics,
then they're not about what you do.
Have you ever looked in an actual linguistics journal?
(1) They use speak linguist
Hunh?
Typo
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
(2) They refer to Truth Conditional semantics that is anchored in logic
If we could see that, we would know they're not doing linguistics.
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
So unless you are dishonest it is clear to see that some aspects of
linguistics are anchored in logic, thus forming a cross disciplinary bridge.
Since you know nothing of linguistics, it's hard to see how you can
justify such a claim.
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
You did a search on "truth condition" in the Journal
of Semantics. Have you read any of the abstracts that
that search located or perhaps even one of the articles?
A "field of study" called truth conditional semantics exists.
It is a sub-field of philosophy and has little relation to
linguistics.
The main defect of truth conditional semantics from a
linguistic POV is that it only applies to a subset of
declarative sentences.
Finally you get specific. How is it only a subset?
Post by DKleinecke
A corollary defect is that what
it does with those sentences sheds no light on the
questions about syntax etc. that linguists ask.
Of course it is not going to answer syntax questions when it is
only addressing the semantics aspects. Although the syntax of
semantics can be formalized in HOL the syntax of linguistics
is not referring to the syntax of semantics, these two are
mutually exclusive.
Truth conditional semantics applies only to such
declarative sentences as can meaningfully be assessed
as true or false.

An example of a declarative sentence to which true or
false cannot be assigned is
God is love.

IMO most declarative sentences are of this nature -
true or false is not a meaningful attribute. Those that
are seem to mostly be what I would call "true/false by
definition". For example
Tiger are cats.
The semantics here are that one has either defined
"tiger" in terms of "cat" or vice versa.

IMO most declarative sentences are not truth conditional.
peteolcott
2018-11-09 04:46:59 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
These guys are linguists and all their articles are based on Davidson's
Truth conditional semantics, thus proving that formalization derives the
Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
Since all that leads to is a bunch of titles in a shopping cart, with a
few lines from an abstract, and no hint of who any of the authors are,
I have no way of knowing what their articles are about. If they are about
Tarski and Goedel, then they're not linguistics. If they're about linguistics,
then they're not about what you do.
Have you ever looked in an actual linguistics journal?
(1) They use speak linguist
Hunh?
Typo
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
(2) They refer to Truth Conditional semantics that is anchored in logic
If we could see that, we would know they're not doing linguistics.
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
So unless you are dishonest it is clear to see that some aspects of
linguistics are anchored in logic, thus forming a cross disciplinary bridge.
Since you know nothing of linguistics, it's hard to see how you can
justify such a claim.
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
You did a search on "truth condition" in the Journal
of Semantics. Have you read any of the abstracts that
that search located or perhaps even one of the articles?
A "field of study" called truth conditional semantics exists.
It is a sub-field of philosophy and has little relation to
linguistics.
The main defect of truth conditional semantics from a
linguistic POV is that it only applies to a subset of
declarative sentences.
Finally you get specific. How is it only a subset?
Post by DKleinecke
A corollary defect is that what
it does with those sentences sheds no light on the
questions about syntax etc. that linguists ask.
Of course it is not going to answer syntax questions when it is
only addressing the semantics aspects. Although the syntax of
semantics can be formalized in HOL the syntax of linguistics
is not referring to the syntax of semantics, these two are
mutually exclusive.
Truth conditional semantics applies only to such
declarative sentences as can meaningfully be assessed
as true or false.
An example of a declarative sentence to which true or
false cannot be assigned is
God is love.
http://the-pete.org/?p=263
Post by DKleinecke
IMO most declarative sentences are of this nature -
true or false is not a meaningful attribute. Those that
are seem to mostly be what I would call "true/false by
definition". For example
Tiger are cats.
The semantics here are that one has either defined
"tiger" in terms of "cat" or vice versa.
IMO most declarative sentences are not truth conditional.
Ah I see what you mean. It is not actually that most declarative
sentence are not truth conditional, it is that the Boolean value
of the truth condition of most declarative sentences cannot often
be definitively determined.
DKleinecke
2018-11-09 05:23:09 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
These guys are linguists and all their articles are based on Davidson's
Truth conditional semantics, thus proving that formalization derives the
Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
Since all that leads to is a bunch of titles in a shopping cart, with a
few lines from an abstract, and no hint of who any of the authors are,
I have no way of knowing what their articles are about. If they are about
Tarski and Goedel, then they're not linguistics. If they're about linguistics,
then they're not about what you do.
Have you ever looked in an actual linguistics journal?
(1) They use speak linguist
Hunh?
Typo
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
(2) They refer to Truth Conditional semantics that is anchored in logic
If we could see that, we would know they're not doing linguistics.
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
So unless you are dishonest it is clear to see that some aspects of
linguistics are anchored in logic, thus forming a cross disciplinary bridge.
Since you know nothing of linguistics, it's hard to see how you can
justify such a claim.
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
You did a search on "truth condition" in the Journal
of Semantics. Have you read any of the abstracts that
that search located or perhaps even one of the articles?
A "field of study" called truth conditional semantics exists.
It is a sub-field of philosophy and has little relation to
linguistics.
The main defect of truth conditional semantics from a
linguistic POV is that it only applies to a subset of
declarative sentences.
Finally you get specific. How is it only a subset?
Post by DKleinecke
A corollary defect is that what
it does with those sentences sheds no light on the
questions about syntax etc. that linguists ask.
Of course it is not going to answer syntax questions when it is
only addressing the semantics aspects. Although the syntax of
semantics can be formalized in HOL the syntax of linguistics
is not referring to the syntax of semantics, these two are
mutually exclusive.
Truth conditional semantics applies only to such
declarative sentences as can meaningfully be assessed
as true or false.
An example of a declarative sentence to which true or
false cannot be assigned is
God is love.
http://the-pete.org/?p=263
Post by DKleinecke
IMO most declarative sentences are of this nature -
true or false is not a meaningful attribute. Those that
are seem to mostly be what I would call "true/false by
definition". For example
Tiger are cats.
The semantics here are that one has either defined
"tiger" in terms of "cat" or vice versa.
IMO most declarative sentences are not truth conditional.
Ah I see what you mean. It is not actually that most declarative
sentence are not truth conditional, it is that the Boolean value
of the truth condition of most declarative sentences cannot often
be definitively determined.
Following that thought you might do better with a
three-values logic - true/don't_know/false. The
truth table for "or" would be

T T T
T ? ?
T ? F

and for "not"

F ? T

All the other logical operations can be defined in
terms of these two - for example

P and Q = not ((not P) or (not Q))
peteolcott
2018-11-09 05:32:00 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
These guys are linguists and all their articles are based on Davidson's
Truth conditional semantics, thus proving that formalization derives the
Many linguistic articles pertaining to: Truth-conditional semantics
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
Since all that leads to is a bunch of titles in a shopping cart, with a
few lines from an abstract, and no hint of who any of the authors are,
I have no way of knowing what their articles are about. If they are about
Tarski and Goedel, then they're not linguistics. If they're about linguistics,
then they're not about what you do.
Have you ever looked in an actual linguistics journal?
(1) They use speak linguist
Hunh?
Typo
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
(2) They refer to Truth Conditional semantics that is anchored in logic
If we could see that, we would know they're not doing linguistics.
(1) They speak linguist, thus are linguists
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by peteolcott
So unless you are dishonest it is clear to see that some aspects of
linguistics are anchored in logic, thus forming a cross disciplinary bridge.
Since you know nothing of linguistics, it's hard to see how you can
justify such a claim.
Have you ever looked in an actual journal, or even book, of linguistics?
https://academic.oup.com/jos/search-results?page=1&q=truth%20condition&fl_SiteID=5212&SearchSourceType=1&allJournals=1
You did a search on "truth condition" in the Journal
of Semantics. Have you read any of the abstracts that
that search located or perhaps even one of the articles?
A "field of study" called truth conditional semantics exists.
It is a sub-field of philosophy and has little relation to
linguistics.
The main defect of truth conditional semantics from a
linguistic POV is that it only applies to a subset of
declarative sentences.
Finally you get specific. How is it only a subset?
Post by DKleinecke
A corollary defect is that what
it does with those sentences sheds no light on the
questions about syntax etc. that linguists ask.
Of course it is not going to answer syntax questions when it is
only addressing the semantics aspects. Although the syntax of
semantics can be formalized in HOL the syntax of linguistics
is not referring to the syntax of semantics, these two are
mutually exclusive.
Truth conditional semantics applies only to such
declarative sentences as can meaningfully be assessed
as true or false.
An example of a declarative sentence to which true or
false cannot be assigned is
God is love.
http://the-pete.org/?p=263
Post by DKleinecke
IMO most declarative sentences are of this nature -
true or false is not a meaningful attribute. Those that
are seem to mostly be what I would call "true/false by
definition". For example
Tiger are cats.
The semantics here are that one has either defined
"tiger" in terms of "cat" or vice versa.
IMO most declarative sentences are not truth conditional.
Ah I see what you mean. It is not actually that most declarative
sentence are not truth conditional, it is that the Boolean value
of the truth condition of most declarative sentences cannot often
be definitively determined.
Following that thought you might do better with a
three-values logic - true/don't_know/false. The
truth table for "or" would be
T T T
T ? ?
T ? F
and for "not"
F ? T
All the other logical operations can be defined in
terms of these two - for example
P and Q = not ((not P) or (not Q))
I am totally ruling out even considering anything that is not a strictly logical
truth until my refutation of Godel and Tarski is accepted.

http://liarparadox.org/index.php/2018/11/09/simplifying-the-tarski-undefinability-sentence/

http://liarparadox.org/index.php/2018/11/04/godels-1931-incompleteness-theorem-as-simple-as-possible/
DKleinecke
2018-11-09 17:33:04 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
I am totally ruling out even considering anything that is not a strictly logical
truth until my refutation of Godel and Tarski is accepted.
For me personally the chances of that happening are just one
point greater than zero.
peteolcott
2018-11-09 22:59:47 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
I am totally ruling out even considering anything that is not a strictly logical
truth until my refutation of Godel and Tarski is accepted.
For me personally the chances of that happening are just one
point greater than zero.
Chance is merely a fiction that minds create to account for their ignorance.
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-07 07:17:14 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by peteolcott
Post by DKleinecke
Post by peteolcott
AI can never make very much progress Until Tarski Undefinability is refuted and a mathematical model of ∀x True(x) is completed.
True(x) is the ultimate anchor of all truth conditional semantics.
Truth conditional semantics unifies the formalization of natural language semantics into one a single goal.
AI is NOT the goal of linguistics. Truth conditional semantics
is NOT the semantics of human speech. Formalization is NOT the
goal of linguistics.
How many times do I have to prove that you are wrong about this?
https://academic.oup.com/jos
your approach of "linguistics" has nothing to do with linguistics.
You're not a linguist, and you do not even remotely understand what true linguistics as practised by true linguists looks like.
Your semantic mental jail has nothing to do with linguistics.
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-05 14:16:55 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" -- "How many times does it have to be
repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
how many native speakers agree with you on this point?
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-05 15:02:22 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" -- "How many times does it have to be
repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
how many native speakers agree with you on this point?
All of them?
Athel Cornish-Bowden
2018-11-05 20:25:02 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane crap has no
connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" -- "How many times does it have to be>
repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
how many native speakers agree with you on this point?
I do, but I'm just one.
--
athel
Jim Burns
2018-11-05 22:52:49 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Le dimanche 4 novembre 2018 21:52:59 UTC+1,
On Sunday, November 4, 2018 at 1:57:14 PM UTC-5,
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane
crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" --
"How many times does it have to be> repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
how many native speakers agree with you on this point?
I do, but I'm just one.
I agree, too. I'm midwestern United States.
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-06 07:23:40 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Jim Burns
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Le dimanche 4 novembre 2018 21:52:59 UTC+1,
On Sunday, November 4, 2018 at 1:57:14 PM UTC-5,
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane
crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" --
"How many times does it have to be> repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
how many native speakers agree with you on this point?
I do, but I'm just one.
I agree, too. I'm midwestern United States.
interesting.
I have to bow to your judgment.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-06 14:06:04 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Jim Burns
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Le dimanche 4 novembre 2018 21:52:59 UTC+1,
On Sunday, November 4, 2018 at 1:57:14 PM UTC-5,
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane
crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" --
"How many times does it have to be> repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
how many native speakers agree with you on this point?
I do, but I'm just one.
I agree, too. I'm midwestern United States.
interesting.
I have to bow to your judgment.
How would you say the original sentence in French?
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-06 15:28:38 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Jim Burns
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Le dimanche 4 novembre 2018 21:52:59 UTC+1,
On Sunday, November 4, 2018 at 1:57:14 PM UTC-5,
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane
crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" --
"How many times does it have to be> repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
how many native speakers agree with you on this point?
I do, but I'm just one.
I agree, too. I'm midwestern United States.
interesting.
I have to bow to your judgment.
How would you say the original sentence in French?
I wrote the English sentence from scratch.
There's no French original.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-06 15:31:26 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Jim Burns
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Le dimanche 4 novembre 2018 21:52:59 UTC+1,
On Sunday, November 4, 2018 at 1:57:14 PM UTC-5,
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane
crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" --
"How many times does it have to be> repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
how many native speakers agree with you on this point?
I do, but I'm just one.
I agree, too. I'm midwestern United States.
interesting.
I have to bow to your judgment.
How would you say the original sentence in French?
I wrote the English sentence from scratch.
There's no French original.
? You can't say that in French?
Alan Smaill
2018-11-06 16:59:57 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Jim Burns
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Le dimanche 4 novembre 2018 21:52:59 UTC+1,
On Sunday, November 4, 2018 at 1:57:14 PM UTC-5,
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane
crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" --
"How many times does it have to be> repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
how many native speakers agree with you on this point?
I do, but I'm just one.
I agree, too. I'm midwestern United States.
interesting.
I have to bow to your judgment.
How would you say the original sentence in French?
I wrote the English sentence from scratch.
There's no French original.
? You can't say that in French?
Vas-y, Arnauld !
--
Alan Smaill
wugi
2018-11-08 16:53:20 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane
crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" --
"How many times does it have to be repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
(...)
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
I have to bow to your judgment.
How would you say the original sentence in French?
I wrote the English sentence from scratch.
There's no French original.
? You can't say that in French?
My try, and E. ~ F. here:

Combien de fois faut-il te répéter que ...?
How many times does it take repeating to you that ...?
--
guido wugi
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-08 21:22:47 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by wugi
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane
crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" --
"How many times does it have to be repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
(...)
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
I have to bow to your judgment.
How would you say the original sentence in French?
I wrote the English sentence from scratch.
There's no French original.
? You can't say that in French?
Combien de fois faut-il te répéter que ...?
How many times does it take repeating to you that ...?
That almost works in English; no passive! It would be better as "How many
repetitions does it take ..."
Alan Smaill
2018-11-09 12:21:55 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by wugi
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane
crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" --
"How many times does it have to be repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
(...)
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
I have to bow to your judgment.
How would you say the original sentence in French?
I wrote the English sentence from scratch.
There's no French original.
? You can't say that in French?
Combien de fois faut-il te répéter que ...?
How many times does it take repeating to you that ...?
That almost works in English; no passive! It would be better as "How many
repetitions does it take ..."
How often do you have to be told that ...
--
Alan Smaill
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-09 13:44:06 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Alan Smaill
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by wugi
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane
crap has no connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" --
"How many times does it have to be repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
(...)
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Peter T. Daniels
Post by Arnaud Fournet
I have to bow to your judgment.
How would you say the original sentence in French?
I wrote the English sentence from scratch.
There's no French original.
? You can't say that in French?
Combien de fois faut-il te répéter que ...?
How many times does it take repeating to you that ...?
That almost works in English; no passive! It would be better as "How many
repetitions does it take ..."
How often do you have to be told that ...
Well, yes, but that's not a transformation demonstrating the selectional
restrictions on the original lexical items. It's an AUE rather than a
sci.lang response.
Athel Cornish-Bowden
2018-11-10 17:16:41 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane crap has no
connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" -- "How many times does it have to be>
repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
how many native speakers agree with you on this point?
Funny coincidence.
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your theory has no
connection with linguitics?
ou bien y-a-t-il un problème?
Merci.
at fr.lettres.langue.anglaise

Can this be the same person who posted here as yangg a few years ago?
--
athel
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-10 22:18:21 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane crap has no
connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" -- "How many times does it have to be>
repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
how many native speakers agree with you on this point?
Funny coincidence.
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your theory has no
connection with linguitics?
ou bien y-a-t-il un problème?
Merci.
at fr.lettres.langue.anglaise
Can this be the same person who posted here as yangg a few years ago?
Evidemment.
Peter T. Daniels
2018-11-11 02:15:09 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Arnaud Fournet
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your insane crap has no
connection whatsoever with linguitics.
Not a possible "dative passive" -- "How many times does it have to be>
repeated to you that ..."
Unlike "Pete was given a warning by Arnaud."
how many native speakers agree with you on this point?
Funny coincidence.
Post by Arnaud Fournet
How many times do you need to be repeated that your theory has no
connection with linguitics?
ou bien y-a-t-il un problème?
Merci.
at fr.lettres.langue.anglaise
Can this be the same person who posted here as yangg a few years ago?
and ... We have a lurker!

Franz Gnaedinger
2018-11-05 07:38:11 UTC
Reply
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Post by peteolcott
Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
Peter Olcott holds a copyright on his claims that he knows the absolute and
complete and total truth and is the author of life and creator of life and
has hundred reasons to believe that he is God and he creates our future minds
in order that we can go on existing and he is both a huiman being _and_ God
and the Creator of the Universe, and of course Goedel was wrong, because
there is only one God, Allgod.
Arnaud Fournet
2018-11-05 14:14:46 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Franz Gnaedinger
Post by peteolcott
Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
Peter Olcott holds a copyright on his claims that he knows the absolute and
complete and total truth and is the author of life and creator of life and
has hundred reasons to believe that he is God and he creates our future minds
in order that we can go on existing and he is both a huiman being _and_ God
and the Creator of the Universe, and of course Goedel was wrong, because
there is only one God, Allgod.
Rather a coprorectum, than a copyright.
Vowels matter !
HOLY GHOST
2018-11-05 14:33:30 UTC
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[snip rant]
Power (graviton) = c^5 / Gravitational constant
Gravitational constant = c^4 / Power (graviton)

P = c^4 / G
G = c^4 / P

HOLY GHOST
Talk.Origins
2018-11-05 14:42:58 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by HOLY GHOST
[snip rant]
Power (graviton) = c^5 / Gravitational constant
Gravitational constant = c^5 / Power (graviton)
P = c^5 / G
G = c^5 / P
HOLY GHOST
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=oopsie%20daisy

Power (graviton) = c^5 / Gravitational constant
Gravitational constant = c^5 / Power (graviton)

P = c^5 / G
G = c^5 / P

Talk Origins, ^5's
Holy Ghost
2018-11-05 14:48:33 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Talk.Origins
Post by HOLY GHOST
[snip rant]
Power (graviton) = c^5 / Gravitational constant
Gravitational constant = c^5 / Power (graviton)
P = c^5 / G
G = c^5 / P
HOLY GHOST
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=oopsie%20daisy
Power (graviton) = c^5 / Gravitational constant
Gravitational constant = c^5 / Power (graviton)
P = c^5 / G
G = c^5 / P
Talk Origins, ^5's
^5's!

Holy Ghost
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